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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

A.

INTRODUCTION

This memo examines the legality of the establishment and jurisdiction of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon.*
B.
(1)

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The STL may not qualify as established in accordance with the rule of law if trials in

absentia are determined to violate due process or if Article 3 of the STL’s Statute is applied to
utilize joint criminal enterprise or superior responsibility, in violation of nullum crime sine lege.
(2)

*

Statutory Interpretation regarding Joint Criminal Enterprise: Does Article 3(1)(b) of the STL Statute refer to
the Joint Criminal Enterprise doctrine (JCE) or to another mode of liability? If this provision does not refer to JCE,
what was the intent of the drafters of the Statute regarding the meaning of this provision?
Roots in codes of Superior Responsibility doctrine: What support is there for the proposition that the doctrine of
superior responsibility is rooted in national criminal and military codes? Which ones? Is it possible to find
concordant law-cases issued before February 14 2005 by national courts from different legal systems which
establishes that superior responsibility as set out in Article 3 of the STL Statute is applicable to terrorists acts,
murder or other crimes within the jurisdiction of the STL?

1

III.

THE TRIBUNAL
The Agreement between Lebanon and the U.N. was made effective under Resolution

1757, thereby bringing the Statute defining the creation of the STL into effect.1 The Statute
defined jurisdiction and applicable law, organization of the Tribunal, rights of defendants and
victims, and conduct of the proceedings.
A.

APPLICABLE LAW

Unlike previous ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, the STL will apply only domestic Lebanese
law. Prosecution and punishment of crimes are subject to the provisions of the Lebanese
Criminal Code relating to “acts of terrorism, crimes and offences against life and personal
integrity, illicit associations and failure to report crimes and offenses.”2 Further, the STL will
apply Articles 6 and 7 of Lebanese law on “increasing the penalties for sedition, civil war and
interfaith struggle.”3 Because the STL will not prosecute crimes under international law, no
defendant can be charged with international crimes, including war crimes and crimes against
humanity. The Secretary-General reports that the “standards of justice and guarantees of due
process of law are modeled on the highest international standards of criminal justice.”4 The
STL’s application of these standards includes rights of suspects under questioning to speak in a
language he or she understands, and the right to be informed that he or she is a suspect, to remain
silent, to have legal assistance of his or her own choosing, and to be questioned in the presence

1

Statute for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (hereinafter STL Statute), S.C. Res. 1757, Attachment, U.N. Doc
S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). [reproduced at Tab 24]

2

Id. at Art. 2(a). [reproduced at Tab 24]

3

Id. at (b). [reproduced at Tab 24]

4

Sec-Gen Report at ¶ 31. [reproduced at Tab 33]

2

of counsel.5 Further, the accused are “equal before the Tribunal” and are entitled to a fair and
public hearing, are presumed innocent until proven guilty, and are entitled to minimum
guarantees of due process under Article 16 of the STL Statute.6
Unlike other “criminal tribunals established or assisted by the United Nations” that have
come before it, the STL utilizes more civil than common law elements and is the first tribunal to
“combine substantial elements of both legal systems.”7 The STL, in fact, has an investigating
judge; further, judges “will take a more active role in the conduct of the trial process and the
examination of witnesses.”8 The STL also intends to utilize trials in absentia9, common in many
civil law systems. Finally, the UNIIIC investigations became beginnings of the Office of the
Prosecutor10 with a transition from UNIIIC operations11 to operation of the Office of the
Prosecution occurring during January and February of 2009, concluding with the Prosecutor
taking his seat on 1 March 2009.12

5

STL Statute at Art. 15. [reproduced at Tab 24]

6

Id. at Article 16. [reproduced at Tab 24]

7

Sec-Gen Report at ¶ 8-9. [reproduced at Tab 33]

8

Id. at ¶32. [reproduced at Tab 33]

9

STL Statute at Art. 22. [reproduced at Tab 24]

10

Sec-Gen Report at ¶ 8-9. [reproduced at Tab 33]

11

UNIIIC operations were extended beyond its initial mandate, pursuant to S.C. Res. 1748, U.N. Doc S/RES/1748
(Mar. 27, 2007) [reproduced at Tab 22] and S.C. Res. 1852, U.N. Doc S/RES/1852 (Dec. 17, 2008). [reproduced
at Tab 25]

12

Secretary-General, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1757 (2007),¶ 17-19, U.N. Doc S/200/106 (February 24, 2009). [reproduced at Tab 37]

3

B.

JURISDICTION

The STL exercises very limited temporal jurisdiction, covering only “the persons
responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons.”13 However, if the Tribunal
finds other violence in Lebanon connected by motive, purpose, nature of the victims targeted,
pattern of attacks, or perpetrators between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005 or any later
date during the course of its investigation, the U.N. can grant consent to expand jurisdiction.14
The Secretary-General explained that expansion of jurisdiction would be “not an extension of the
temporal jurisdiction,” but instead “an extension of its jurisdiction to include, within a specified
period, other attacks that the tribunal might find to be connected to the Hariri assassination and
similar to it in nature and gravity.”15 He also explained that the other attacks’ inclusion comes
from the emerging links between the violence and the Hariri assassination, as well as the interest
of the Security Council in “judicial accountability beyond” Hariri’s assassination, and an interest
in avoiding “perception of selective justice.”16
The STL’s Statute explains its personal jurisdiction, providing the Tribunal with
“jurisdiction over persons responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons.”17 The

13

STL Statute at Art. 1. [reproduced at Tab 24]

14

Id. [reproduced at Tab 24]

15

Sec-Gen Report at ¶ 11. [reproduced at Tab 33]

16

Id. at ¶12. [reproduced at Tab 33]

17

STL Statute at Art. 1. [reproduced at Tab 24]
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Secretary-General notes that this language permits the prosecution “to pursue its prosecutorial
strategy” and to use the evidence gathered by UNIIIC to create its list of indictees.18
The STL’s subject matter jurisdiction derives from crimes outlined in Article 1 of the
Statute, including crimes related to terrorism, sedition, civil war, and interfaith struggle.19 The
Security Council chose not to find these crimes to be crimes against humanity.20
The STL’s jurisdiction is territorially based, as the crimes and their effects happened and
were felt in Lebanon. Article 4 of the STL Statute states that the STL and the national courts of
Lebanon have concurrent jurisdiction, and that the STL has primacy over the national courts.21
This primacy, established through U.N. Resolution 175722, confers jurisdiction to the STL much
in the same way that the U.N. conferred jurisdiction to the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). As
Michael P. Scharf explains, “member states of the Security Council decided to establish the
ICTY and ICTR” with a “binding decision of the Security Council. In doing so, they acted not
as individual states on their own behalf, but rather as member states of the Security Council of
the United Nations acting on behalf of the international community of States.”23 The Security
Council established the STL through Chapter VII powers, just as the ICTY and ICTR were

18

Sec-Gen Report at ¶ 20. [reproduced at Tab 33]

19

STL Statute at Art. 2. [reproduced at Tab 24]

20

Sec-Gen Report at ¶ 23-25. [reproduced at Tab 33]

21

STL Statute at Art. 4. [reproduced at Tab 24]

22

S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). [reproduced at Tab 24]

23

Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S.
Position, 64 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 67, 108 (2001). [reproduced at Tab 14]
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established, in the interest of peace, stability, and ending impunity on behalf of the international
community.24
C.

INTERNATIONAL NATURE OF THE STL

The STL is a Tribunal international in character. A different memo for the Prosecution
addresses this issue at length,25 though this memo addresses it briefly. Article 8 of the Statute
designates the composition of the chambers of the courts. The STL consists of one international
pre-trial judge, three judges in the trial chamber, with one Lebanese judge and two international
judges, and five judges in the appeals chamber, two of whom will be Lebanese and three of
whom will be international. One of the two alternate judges will be Lebanese and the other
international.26 The STL sits outside of Lebanon in neutral territory, in The Hague, and has an
international prosecutor and registrar.27 While the STL does not apply international law, the
mixed composition and location indicate the international character of the tribunal.
This type of international tribunal finds its first incarnation in the STL, though it is not so
unlike its ad hoc and hybrid counterparts; the STL simply sits further toward the domestic end of
the continuum of tribunals. It is noteworthy that the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia have jurisdiction over domestic crimes under the Cambodian Penal Code, including
homicide, torture, and religious persecution, while the Special Court for Sierra Leone has

24

U.N. S.C., 62nd Sess., 5685th mtg., U.N. Doc S/PV.5685 (30 May 2007). [reproduced at Tab 31]

25

Heather Ludwig, State Official Immunity Claims before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

26

U.N. S.C., 62nd Sess., 5685th mtg., Art. 8(1), U.N. Doc S/PV.5685 (30 May 2007). [reproduced at Tab 31]

27

“About the STL”, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, http://www.stl-tsl.org/section/AbouttheSTL. [reproduced at Tab
56]
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jurisdiction over arson and sexual abuse of children under domestic law.28 While the STL does
not have jurisdiction over crimes based in international law, jurisdiction over domestic crimes is
certainly not unprecedented in internationalized tribunals.
In order to assess the relative international character of the STL as compared to the other
ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, a comparison of staff composition, location, applicable law, funding,
and establishing mechanisms provide insight:
TABLE: Comparison of Internationalized, Ad Hoc, and Hybrid Tribunals
Staff

Funding

Law

Location

Establishing
Mechanism

Special Tribunal for
Lebanon29

Mixed

Mixed

Domestic

Neutral territory

International
Criminal Tribunal for
the former
Yugoslavia30
International
Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda31
Special Court for
Sierra Leone32

Mixed

International

International

Neutral territory

U.N. Security
Council Chapter
VII
U.N. Security
Council Chapter
VII

Mixed

International

International

Neutral territory

U.N. Security
Council Chapter
VII

Mixed

International

Mixed

In Sierra Leone
and neutral
territory

Extraordinary
Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia33

Mixed

Mixed

Mixed

In Cambodia

Agreement
between Sierra
Leone and the
U.N.
Agreement
between
Cambodia and

28

Marko Milanovi, An Odd Couple: Domestic Crimes and International Responsibility in the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1139, 1141-2 (2007). [reproduced at Tab 11]

29

S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). [reproduced at Tab 24]

30

S.C. Res. 827, S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). [reproduced at Tab 29]

31

S.C. Res. 995, S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). [reproduced at Tab 30]

32

Staff, funding, location, establishment mechanism: Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government
of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. – Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002.
[reproduced at Tab 41] Law: Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002. [reproduced at Tab 42]

33

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution
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the U.N.

As is clear in the table, the STL does not differ greatly in most indicators, including location,
funding, and establishing mechanism from other ad hoc and hybrid tribunals. However, the
conspicuous absence of an application of international law does set the STL apart. Further, the
STL is a strange combination where it is like the other hybrid tribunals, yet brought into force in
the manner used for the ad hoc tribunals. However, the remaining indicators tend to signal that
the STL is international in character, even if it is unique because of the combination of its
attributes.

IV.
As discussed at length by Marko Milanovi, the STL’s Statute only applies Lebanese law,
and yet implicates joint criminal enterprise (JCE) and superior responsibility in Article 3. The
application of these modes of criminal responsibility would be problematic under the principle of
nullum crime sine lege,34 meaning “no crime without law.” Violation of this principle is
problematic both in international human rights law, as evidenced by the Article 11 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, as well as criminal law, as seen in Article 22 of the Rome Statute of the

Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea. U.N. – Cambodia,
June 6, 2003. [reproduced at Tab 43]

34

Marko Milanovi, An Odd Couple: Domestic Crimes and International Responsibility in the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1139 (2007). [reproduced at Tab 11]
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ICC.35 If this mode of criminal responsibility does not exist within Lebanese law, then a
defendant cannot lawfully be charged with it.
Article 3(1) states:
(1) A person shall be individually responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Special Tribunal if that person … (b) Contributed in any other way to the
commission of the crime set forth in article 2 of this Statute by a group of persons
acting with a common purpose, where such contribution is intentional and is
either made with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of
the group or in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.36

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) consists of the elements of: (1) a plurality of persons; (2)
existence of a common criminal plan; and (3) participation of the accused in the plan. JCE exists
in three types, including: (1) basic, where all perpetrators act together; (2) systemic, where the
system is criminal in intent and any support of that system equates to responsibility for the
crimes; and (3) extended, the controversial category of JCE, where any violation outside of the
plan that is foreseeable as a result of the plan can create responsibility for all members of the
plan.37
Article 3 of the Statute for the STL looks much like basic or systemic JCE, which are
clear international modes of criminal responsibility. Article 3 should not be applied if the
Tribunal is to maintain its legality as established in accordance with the rule of law.
Further, the STL Statute implicates superior responsibility. Article 2 states:

35

Id. at 1142. [reproduced at Tab 11]

36

STL Statute at Art. 3. [reproduced at Tab 24]

37

Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Enterprise: Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?,
2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 606, 608-9 (2004). [reproduced at Tab 12]
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2. With respect to superior and subordinate relationships, a superior shall be
criminally responsible for any of the crimes set forth in article 2 of this Statute
committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a
result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates,
where:
(a) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information that
clearly indicated that the subordinates were committing or about to commit
such crimes;
(b) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective
responsibility and control of the superior; and
(c) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his
or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to
the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.38

The STL’s definition of superior responsibility is almost identical to the language in Article 28
of the Rome Statute39, and clearly indicates an international mode of criminal responsibility.

38

STL Statute at Art. 2. [reproduced at Tab 24]

39

Rome Statute, at Art. 28: Responsibility of commanders and other superiors [reproduced at Tab 1]

In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court:
(a)

(b)

A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be criminally responsible
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and
control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise
control properly over such forces, where:
(i)

That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should
have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and

(ii)

That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or
her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities
for investigation and prosecution.

With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), a superior shall be
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his
or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such
subordinates, where:
(i)

The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the
subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;

10

Milanovi notes that modes of criminal responsibility like JCE and superior responsibility,
as it is formulated in international law, generally do not exist in domestic criminal law. It is
therefore unlikely that these modes of responsibility exist within the Lebanese Criminal Code.40
If the Prosecutor should choose to charge a defendant with either of these modes of criminal
responsibility, he runs the risk of undermining the STL’s legality. The Prosecution should
conduct a careful review of Lebanese law to find analogous provisions which might allow the
use of these modes of responsibility. Without finding evidence that JCE or superior
responsibility are part of Lebanese domestic law, applying these international modes of criminal
responsibility will render the STL illegally established, where the STL is not established “in
accordance with the rule of law.”
Should the Prosecutor apply international modes of criminal responsibility in the
domestic law setting, the STL will likely not be seen as established in accordance with the rule of
law. Failure to meet this interpretation of legal establishment threatens to undermine the entire
STL and any respect it has in the international community. Therefore, the STL’s legal
establishment should still be considered tenuous at best under the Tadic decision, contingent
upon international receptivity to trials in absentia and the Prosecutor’s discretion in bringing
charges against defendants.

(ii)

The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the
superior; and

(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent
or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution.

40

Marko Milanovi, An Odd Couple: Domestic Crimes and International Responsibility in the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1139 (2007). [reproduced at Tab 11]
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V.

JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES FOR THE STL
Regarding jurisdictional challenges, the STL will likely encounter problems with state

cooperation in its attempts to exercise jurisdiction over defendants. Unfortunately, no state other
than Lebanon is obligated to cooperate with the STL under the language of its statute. Unless the
Security Council were to pass ad hoc resolutions requiring cooperation41 or the state otherwise
commits to cooperate through diplomatic efforts, the STL may not be able to secure cooperation
in some cases. Syria is particularly unlikely to cooperate, which will likely prove to be
extremely problematic for the STL.
A. THE STL’S STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE THIRD-PARTY STATE COOPERATION
The STL may not be able to exercise jurisdiction over defendants because third-party
states are not forced to cooperate under the Resolution that created the STL. When these states
are not required to cooperate, they may not extradite defendants to the STL. The ICTY and
ICTR were established pursuant to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII, as was the
STL. The ICTY42 and ICTR43 statutes both create an obligation for third-party states to

41

Bert Swart, Cooperation Challenges for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1153 (2007).
[reproduced at Tab 17]

42

The ICTY Statute states in Article 29:
1. States shall co-operate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused
of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber,
including, but not limited to:
(a) the identification and location of persons;
(b) the taking of testimony and the production of evidence;
(c) the service of documents;
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal.
[reproduced at Tab 29]

43

S.C. Res. 995, S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) at 2: The Security Council “Decides that all States shall cooperate fully
with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the
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cooperate with the Tribunals.44 Bert Swart states that these statutes do not open “(explicit)
avenues for states to refuse cooperation in specific cases or on specific grounds,” and “all state
are obliged to cooperate with the tribunals in the investigation and prosecution of persons
accused of having committed international crimes” within the tribunals’ jurisdictions.45
The STL’s Statute, unfortunately, does not include the same provisions and therefore,
states are not required to cooperate, nor does the STL have primacy over domestic courts in other
countries. The absence of such a provision is interesting, considering the presence of
cooperation requirements in earlier resolutions dealing with the UNIIIC.46 This conspicuously
absent provision has necessitated the creation of the Draft Agreement on Legal Cooperation with
the Tribunal, which the STL’s President encourages “as many States as possible to ratify … or at
least to consider … as the general legal framework guiding relations of States with the Tribunal
on a case by case basis.”47 Perhaps this agreement will yield at least some international
cooperation. However, Syria is unlikely to cooperate by adopting this agreement considering its
hostility to the STL.
B. THE STL’S PRIMACY OVER DOMESTIC COURTS MAY PREVENT REQUESTS FOR
COOPERATION

International Tribunal and that consequently all States shall take any measures necessary under their domestic
law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of States to
comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under Article 28 of the Statute, and
requests States to keep the Secretary-General informed of such measures.” [reproduced at Tab 30]
44

Bert Swart, Cooperation Challenges for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1153, 1154
(2007). [reproduced at Tab 17]

45

Id. [reproduced at Tab 17]

46

S.C. Res. 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), and 1644 (2005). [reproduced at Tabs 19, 21]

47

Antonio Cassese, “The STL Six Months On: A Bird’s Eye View” (14 September 2009). [reproduced at Tab 52]
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Furthermore, because the STL has primacy over the domestic courts, the domestic courts
may not exercise jurisdiction over anyone indicted by the STL. Because the STL is not an organ
of the Lebanese state, Lebanon may not request cooperation from another state for the judicial
proceedings. However, because the STL is not a state, it cannot request cooperation from states
because it may not become party to a convention on cooperation among states regarding criminal
matters. These primacy issues coupled with the lack of language requiring state cooperation in
its Statute likely makes the STL far less potent in securing cooperation than would be desirable.48
C. THE UN MAY OBLIGE OBJECTING THIRD-PARTY STATES TO COOPERATE
The Security Council is free to pass ad hoc resolutions requiring cooperation of thirdparty states.49 The UN, however, is unlikely to take such action requiring states to do so,
particularly considering the conspicuous absence of such a requirement in the statute for the STL
in the first place.
D. THIRD-PARTY STATES MAY PREFER TO PROSECUTE DOMESTICALLY, THEREBY
DENYING THE STL JURISDICTION
Syria and other objecting states do have an “obligation to prosecute persons suspected of
having committed terrorist crimes if [they] do not hand them over to other states” under
international law generally.50 With the option between extraditing defendants or prosecuting
domestically, Syria and any other objecting third-party state will likely prefer to prosecute any of

48

Bert Swart, Cooperation Challenges for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1153, 1159
(2007). [reproduced at Tab 17]

49

Id. at 1159-60. [reproduced at Tab 17]

50

Id. at 1163. [reproduced at Tab 17]
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its nationals in its own courts. States are entitled to this option under Security Council
resolutions 1373 (2001)51, 1566 (2004)52, and 1624 (2005)53 regarding terrorist crimes.
E. DIPLOMACY AS A MEANS TO SECURE COOPERATION

The STL is left to rely upon diplomacy for third-party state cooperation. As an example,
Nigeria did hand over Charles Taylor to Liberia54, and Nigeria in turn handed him over to Sierra
Leone. Charles Taylor’s extradition was a success story for diplomacy and the international
tribunals. However, considering that Syria is the most likely state to harbor necessary defendants
in STL cases, and noting its hostility to the Tribunal and to Lebanon, diplomacy is an unlikely
path to success.
F. CONCLUSION ON JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
The STL does not have many tools to compel third-party state cooperation and must
anticipate cooperative problems in its attempts to exercise jurisdiction. The STL is left to rely
upon diplomacy or the unlikely commitment of the Security Council to coerce states into
cooperation. Syria likely harbors defendants sought by the STL and some of its government
officials may have been involved in the assassination plot and violence in Lebanon. Syria is
likely to prove particularly difficult in the STL’s attempts to exercise jurisdiction, considering
the tumultuous history and political tension with Lebanon. As noted by Bruce Zagaris, Bashar
Assad, President of Syria, has denied being involved in Hariri’s assassination, and “has said that
51

S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001). [reproduced at Tab 26]

52

S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (2004). [reproduced at Tab 27]

53

S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (2005). [reproduced at Tab 28]

54

BBC, “Nigeria to Give Up Charles Taylor”, Mar. 25, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4845088.stm.
[reproduced at Tab 55]
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Syria will not permit its citizens to appear before the court.”55 In conclusion, the STL faces
difficult paths to cooperation, where cooperative challenges threaten to completely undermine
the STL’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over charged defendants.

55

Bruce Zagaris, Special Tribunal for Lebanon Ready to Start on March 1 in the Hague, 25 No. 4 INT’L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 159 (2009). [reproduced at Tab 18]
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VI.

CONCLUSION
The STL is unique in the method of its establishment and in its application of only

domestic law. The STL also faces challenges because of its uniqueness, where its legal
establishment is tenuous and unclear and it will surely face many challenges to exercising its
jurisdiction.
Regarding legality, the Security Council legally established the STL under Chapter VII
powers under Tadic. However, the Prosecution must tread lightly in its approach to seeking
justice, with respect to international opinion and procedure, if it wishes to maintain the
legitimacy of the STL. If the Prosecutor pursues trials in absentia or utilizes Articles 2 or 3 of
the STL’s Statute with JCE- and superior responsibility-styled modes of criminal responsibility,
the STL may be seen as not being established in accordance with the rule of law. However,
criticisms of the STL infringing Lebanon’s sovereignty and democratic agreement are unfounded
and should be dismissed. Resolution 1757 is not a treaty, nor does it violate the 1986 Vienna
Conventions on the Law of Treaties. Further, the hybrid nature of the STL is not
unconstitutional. Lebanon continues to work with the STL, and indicating in no way that its
sovereignty has been infringed or that broad democratic agreement for the STL does not exist. If
the STL should find itself at odds with Lebanon in the future, it could attempt to rely upon
estoppel to maintain the legality of the STL, where Lebanon has acted in such a way as to imply
its agreement, and whereupon the STL has relied.
Regarding jurisdictional challenges, the STL faces serious obstacles to exercising its
jurisdiction because its Statute does not oblige third-party states to cooperate. The STL must
exercise extensive diplomacy to persuade third-party states to engage in the pursuit of justice, or
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hope that the Security Council might be willing to oblige states to cooperate through ad hoc
resolutions. This is unlikely, particularly as the Draft Agreement on Legal Cooperation with the
Tribunal is already in circulation and states are encouraged to sign. Further, without obligation
to cooperate, states may choose to prosecute defendants in their own courts where the STL does
not have primacy over those domestic courts. Syria is extremely hostile to the STL and is likely
the most important state regarding the STL’s search for defendants to stand trial. Syria is likely
to prevent the STL from exercising jurisdiction over some of the most crucial defendants.
In conclusion, the STL faces a challenging uphill quest to bring the perpetrators of
terrorist violence to justice, but with caution and diplomacy, the STL may still find success.
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